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I. Introduction
The fifteen years since Fleming James addressed the question of
whether manufacturers should be liable without negligence' have seen
a remarkable expansion in the scope of strict liability in the law of
torts, yet the very courts which have been the leaders in this trend have
been consistently troubled by the question of how far strict liability
should extend within the areas in which it is being applied. 2 While
strict liability of the manufacturer for product defects, for example,
has been announced in jurisdiction after jurisdiction,3 in many juris-
dictions this has simply led to a morass of questions regarding the defi-
nition of "defect" and how liability for a defect relates to (a) adequacy
of warnings, (b) unexpected or improper use, (c) assumption of risk,
and even (d) contributory negligence.4 Nor is this at all surprising.
"I" John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.S. 1953, LL.B. 1958, Yale
University; M.A. 1959, Oxford University.
Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. A.B. 1963, Stanford
University; J.D. 1967, Yale University.
1. James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN. L. REv. 923, 924 (1957). See also James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 44.
192 (1955).
2. See, e.g., Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970); Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J.
Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash.2d 4-10. 268 P-d
645 (1954). See also James, The Future of Negligence in Accident Law, 53 VA. L. REv.
911 (1967); Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. RE%. 189
(1965); and Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel-Strict Liability to the Consumer, 50 Mtx.
L. REv. 791 (1966).
Since writing this article, we have read Professor Franklin's excellent article anal)y.ng
the application of various theories of liability in cases of patient claims for hepatitis
resulting from blood transfusions. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis
and a Proposal, 24 STAr. L. REv. 439 (1972). The test for strict liability which we suggest
in this article looks to the same kinds of practical considerations, by and large, as those
which Professor Franklin takes into account in concluding that hospitals and blood
banks should be strictly liable for transfusion related hepatitis.
3. See L. FRuMEFR & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY, § 16A[3], n.2 (1970).
4. See, e.g., as to adequacy of warning, Alman Brothers Farms & Feed Mill, Inc. v.
Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971); Davis v. Wyeth Labora.
tories, Inc., 399 F-2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53,
at 56-59 (2d Cir. 1957); as to unexpected or improper use, Hardy v. Hull Corporation,
446 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1971); Schemel v. General Motors Corporation, 384 F.2d 802 (7th
Cir. 1967); Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1969); as to assumption of risk, Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 407 F.2d 87
(3d Cir. 1969); Sperling v. Hatch, 10 Cal. App. 3d 54, 88 Cal. Rptr. 7f (1970); Bartkeiich
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Strict liability has never meant that the party held strictly liable is to
be a general insurer for the victim no matter how or where the victim
comes to grief. General insurance was not the rule in classical instances
of strict liability, such as ultrahazardous activities, or in legislatively
mandated instances, such as workmen's compensation, and it is not the
rule in the recent instances of application such as products liability."
The questions which the courts now find themselves asking (and being
asked) in the new areas of application, such as products liability, in-
volve the same basic issue as did equally difficult questions faced in tra-
ditional areas of strict liability, which were couched in words such as
"natural or unnatural use" and "arising out of and in the course of
employment." The issue is just where strict liability should stop.
Despite the courts' recognition that strict liability must be limited,
they have seldom been very confident in trying to describe the limits.
Indeed, their efforts at answering the questions posed in strict liability
cases seem in many cases to degenerate into either meaningless seman-
tic disputes or attempts at balancing the costs of the accident against
the costs of avoiding it;6 yet the latter approach sounds devilishly like
the very calculus of negligence, or Learned Hand's test for fault, which
strict liability was meant to replace.
Strict liability's limits can, however, be defined in a meaningful way.
The questions the courts have been asking are often highly relevant to
those limits, and strict liability so limited is very different from the
negligence calculus, or Learned Hand's test for fault. Analysis of strict
liability's limits together with a suggested test for strict liability will,
we believe, give insight into both the negligence calculus and its grow-
ing disfavor.
II. The Learned Hand Test Considered
Learned Hand's test for fault defines the defendant's duty of care as
a function of three variables: (1) the probability that the accident will
v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968); and as to contributory negligence, Friedman
v. General Motors Corp., 411 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1969); Matthias v. Lehn & Fink Products
Corp., 70 Wash.2d 541, 424 P.2d 284 (1967).
5. See as to ultrahazardous activities, W. PRossER, TnE LAW OF ToRTS 517 (4th ed.
1971); as to workmen's compensation, S. HARPER, TIlE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
470 (2d ed. 1920); and as to products liability, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 82 1ll.2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153, 156 (1969)
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 451, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
6. See Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970); Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1971); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 111. App. 2d 315, 327, 229 N.E.2d
684, 690 (1967); cf. Sanders v. Western Auto Supply Co., 183 S.E.2d 321 (S.Car. 1971). See
also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
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occur, (2) the gravity of the injury which will be suffered if the acci-
dent does occur, and (3) the burden of precautions adequate to pre-
vent such accidents.7 If the cost to the defendant of avoiding the acci-
dent would have been less than the cost of the accident, discounted by
the probability of its occurrence, the defendant's failure to avoid the
accident is termed negligence.8
For the purpose of the first parts of this discussion, we will assume
that the traditional test for fault, as given expression in Learned Hand's
formula, was designed to do what Professor Posner says it was designed
to do,9 namely to minimize the sum of accident costs and the costs of
accident avoidance. 10 The Learned Hand test would seem to accom-
plish this objective in theory, because if it were applied perfectly, it
would put the costs of the accident on the injurer when and only when
it was cheaper for him to avoid the accident costs by appropriate safety
measures than to pay those costs. Assuming injurers had the requisite
foresight, this would cause potential injurers to avoid all accidents
-worth avoiding, i.e., those where avoidance costs less than the accident,
and to have only those accidents not worth avoiding.'1
The application of the traditional rule of contributory negligence
would make some difference, but not much. Using the rubric of the
test, contributory negligence would exist when the victim, too, could
have avoided the accident at a cost lower than the cost generated by
the accident. Since under the traditional rule contributory negligence
is a complete defense, the cost would remain on the victim despite the
negligence of the injurer, even if avoidance by the injurer would have
7. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312
U.S. 492; United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
8. Perhaps anticipating what others would do in the name of his test, Judge Hand
cautioned that "[the three elements of the test] are practically not susceptible of any
quantitative estimate, and the second two are generally not so, even theoretically..
Conway v. O'Brien, III F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d
148 (2d Cir. 1949).
9. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Posner].
10. Our assumption, more precisely, is that the object is optimization of primary
accident costs. See G. CALArm r, TaE CoS OF AccsoD'rs 26-31 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Cosrs]. But the statement in text is sufficiently accurate for purposes of this article.
11. The goal, strictly speaking, is accident cost avoidance rather than accident avoid.
ance. It may be, for example, that minimization of the sum of automobile accident costs
and avoidance costs would come about by measures designed to make automobiles
"crashproof" rather than by measures directed at the avoidance of automobile accidents
altogether.
In determining whether an accident cost is worth avoiding, the test would look not
to the entire cost of the safety measure which would avoid it, but to the cost of that
safety measure discounted appropriately to take account of all of the other accident
costs that same measure would avoid. Thus the cost of avoiding a given accident is
ten dollars if a 100 dollar safety device would also avoid nine other accidents of equal
severity.
There are numerous other assumptions implicit in the application of any test of this
kind, but this is not the place to discuss them. See CosTs, supra note 10, passim.
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cost less than avoidance by the victim. Thus, even in the wonderful,
let us freely admit, fantastic world of Professor Posner, in which none
of the costs of an accident are borne by third parties other than the
injurer and victim, and in which there is perfect foresight, the rule of
contributory negligence would prevent the negligence calculus from
optimizing primary accident cost reduction. The potential injurer who
could avoid a $100 accident at a cost of $5, knowing that the victim
could do so at a cost of $50, might well not undertake the $5 safety
measure because of his knowledge that the victim will either avoid the
accident or be held contributorily negligent. Given adequate foresight,
one would expect the accident to be avoided, but at a cost $45 higher
than necessary.
12
A Learned Hand test for injurer liability with the defense of con-
tributory negligence removed, however, would also fail to optimize acci-
dent costs, and for exactly the same reason. Under such a rule, there
would be instances in which the victim who could avoid an accident
more cheaply than could the injurer would fail to do so, because he
would know that the injurer would nonetheless be held liable. Thus
the correct optimizing rule, under the Learned Hand test, would be to
have a doctrine of contributory negligence, but to apply it only where
the cost of injurer avoidance exceeds the cost of victim avoidance. 1
Whatever defects the Learned Hand test may have, given the exist-
ence of an absolute defense of contributory negligence, it can at least
be said that if the test worked, all the accidents worth avoiding would
be avoided. If they were occasionally avoided at somewhat greater ex-
pense than necessary, that would not be a matter of great consequence.
At the same time, it must be recognized that all the costs of all the acci-
dents not worth avoiding would fall on the victim, raising distributional
or justice issues. We will, however, postpone consideration of those
issues to a later section of this article, and limit our discussion here to
primary accident cost reduction.14
If we make the assumptions under which the Learned Hand test
would work adequately, the fascinating thing is that as good a result
in terms of reducing primary accident costs could be achieved by a
liability rule which is the exact reverse of the Learned Hand test. Un-
12. The $45 excess cost would be avoided only in the yet more wonderful world of
Professor Coase, where transaction costs are nonexistent, and a pre.accident "bribe" of
the injurer by the victim would result in the injurer taking the $5 safety measure. See
Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960), Calabresi, Transaction
Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 67 (1968),
and CoSTs, supra note 10, at 135-40.
13. Professor Posner realizes this, and adds that this refinement, though not explicit
in the cases, may be implicit in them. Posner, supra note 9, at 33.
14. See part VI, infra.
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der such a "reverse Learned Hand test," the costs of an accident would
be borne by the injurer unless accident avoidance on the part of the
victim would have cost less than the accident. If a reverse contributory
negligence test were added, the victim would bear the accident costs
only if the injurer could not also have avoided the accident at less cost
than the accident entailed. A reverse Learned Hand test, in other words,
which always made the injurer liable without fault unless the victim
were negligent, and even then held the injurer liable if he also were
negligent, would do for primary accident cost avoidance just what the
actual Learned Hand test with contributory negligence is said to do.
The only difference between the tests is distributional. Under the
Learned Hand test, the costs of all accidents not worth avoiding are
borne by victims, whereas under the reverse Learned Hand test they
would be borne by injurers.15
In focusing on the reverse Learned Hand test, we are not simply
playing with mirrors. The point is that a perfect world with perfect
foresight is a prerequisite to optimization of primary accident cost re-
duction under either Learned Hand type test, and that given such a
world, any number of other devices would also accomplish that goal.16
To the extent that we are concerned with the practical minimization
of accident costs, the choice among these devices will depend not on
their theoretical ability to optimize accident costs given certain assump-
tions, but on the degree to which the particular assumptions required
by each device actually do obtain.1 7 We will suggest a test which we
think is much more likely than either Learned Hand type test to ac-
complish a satisfactory job of primary accident cost optimization. We
also think that application of the proposed test requires asking ques-
tions which are closely related to those questions courts have always
asked in strict liability cases. That is why we believe the proposed test
is an appropriate one for defining the limits of strict liability.
15. As our subsequent discussion indicates, the practical implications of the two
tests are also very different. It may be, for example, that one test would result in more
disputes over the shifting of losses than would the other, and thus in greater adminis-
trative costs. This practical consideration was, in Holmes' view, an overriding one. See
0. HoL.srs, THE COMmON LAW (Howe ed. 1963) 76-77. But cf. CosTs, supra note 10, at
261-62.
16. Consider, for example, a test pursuant to which an all-knowing accident prc-en-
tion agency issues an accident avoidance order to the appropriate part)' whenever an
accident is worth avoiding, with a sanction sufficiently severe to guarantee that the
order will be followed. Compare Cosns, supra note 10, at 111-13. See note 73 infra.
17. These assumptions relate, inter alia, to the cost of information to each party, the
absence of psychological or other impediments to acting on the basis of available in-
formation, the administrative costs of shifting losses, and the extent to which parties
actually bear the costs which the particular tests impose upon them. These are, in
economists' terms, principally assumptions relating to transaction costs and externaliza-
tion. See generally CosTs, supra note 10, at 55-64, 143-50, 178-86, 244-50.
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III. The Strict Liability Test Defined
When a case comes to judgment under either of the two Learned
Hand type tests, a cost-benefit analysis is made by an outside govern-
mental institution (a judge or a jury) as to the relative costs of the
accident and of accident avoidance.' 8 Liability would be placed on the
party initially free of responsibility only if the decider found the bene-
fits of avoidance (i.e., not incurring the cost of the accident) to be
greater than the costs of such avoidance to that party. The strict lia-
bility test we suggest does not require that a governmental institution
make such a cost-benefit analysis. It requires of such an institution only
a decision as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best posi.
tion to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and acci-
dent avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made. The
question for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider.10
So stated, the strict liability test sounds deceptively simple to apply.
Instead of requiring a judgment as to whether an injurer should have
avoided the accident costs because the costs of avoidance were less than
the foreseeable accident costs as the Learned Hand test does, the strict
liability test would simply require a decision as to whether the injurer
or the victim was in the better position both to judge whether avoid-
ance costs would exceed foreseeable accident costs and to act on that
judgment.20 The issue becomes not whether avoidance is worth it, but
18. The decision may also be made by the legislature, as it sometimes is through
the application of the 'negligence per se" concept. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, Tilt:
LAW OF TORTS, § 17.6 (1956). The history of the respective roles of judges and Juries III
the making of the analysis can be seen in cases such as Grand Trunk Ry. V. Ives, 144
U.S. 408 (1892); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); Pokora v. Wabash
Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (limiting Goodman); Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 49 N.E.
1010 (1897); and Sylvester v. Shea, 280 Mass. 508, 182 N.E. 916 (1932). See also Nixon,
Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAw F CONTEMI'.
PROB. 476 (1936).
19. The cheapest cost avoider has been elsewhere defined as the party "an arbitrary
initial bearer of accident costs would (in the absence of transaction and information
costs) find it most worthwhile to 'bribe' in order to obtain that modification of be-
havior which would lessen accident costs most." Cosrs, supra note 10, at 135. This
definition, unlike the terminology we have been using in this article, includes the costs
of accident avoidance within the term "accident costs." It should be clear upon reflection
that the most "worthwhile" bribe would be one to the party who is in the best position
both to determine what accident cost avoidance measures will result in the minimal
sum of avoidance costs and accident costs (i.e., to make the cost-benefit analysis) and
to act upon that determination. We do not mean to suggest that the party in the best
position to make the cost-benefit analysis is always in the best position to act upon It;
where that is not the case, the decision requires weighing comparative advantages.
The imposition of accident costs on the cheapest cost avoider will, of course, have
its own set of distributional consequences, and these may well differ from those resulting
from applications of the Learned Hand or reverse Learned Hand tests.
20. We are assuming for purposes of the discussion in text that accident costs and
avoidance costs are not only ascertainable but also fungible, so that the cost-benefit
analysis involves only a comparison of relative costs. We would guess that in practice
the judge or jury making the cost-benefit analysis under the Learned Hand test would
1060
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts
which of the parties is relatively more likely to find out whether avoid-
ance is worth it. This judgment is by no means an easy one, but we
would suggest that in practice it is usually easier to make correctly than
is the judgment required under either the Learned Hand test or its
reverse.21 It also implies a lesser degree of governmental intervention
than does either of the Hand type tests.
22
As a first step toward seeing what is implied in such a strict liability
test, we propose to examine how the issues raised by courts in various
areas of strict liability relate to the proposed test. We will do this first
in an oversimplified context, treating accidents as though they involved
only the injurer and the victim. Subsequently, we will examine what is
implied for the test in considering accidents as events involving whole
categories of victims, injurers and affected third parties.
In strict products liability cases, the first question asked is, "was
there a defect?" A defect may be defined to mean simply that some-
thing went wrong. All that in turn means, however, is that a safer prod-
uct might have been designed, and this would mean that there is a
defect whenever there is an accident. If, instead, existence of a defect
is defined to mean a failure of a product to meet levels deemed cus-
tomary in the trade, then strict liability would be even less successful
in achieving optimal reduction of primary accident costs than is the
Learned Hand test and would be far narrower than fault.2 3 It is not
surprising, therefore, that courts have tended to reject both of these
extremes. 24
be significantly affected by considerations other than the relative costs of accidents and
accident avoidance, though this is expressly denied by Professor Posner. Posner, supra
note 9, at 31-32, 33-34. These other considerations, involving the collectively determined
worth of the parties or the activities they are engaged in, are in fact of crucial im-
portance in determining the type and level of accident cost causing activities a society
wishes to permit. The manner in which we would introduce them into the decision
is discussed under the heading of "specific deterrence" in CoSTS, supra note 10, at 95-129,
174-98. See also notes 72 & 73 infra and accompanying text.
21. It is an easier judgment because it looks to questions such as which party is
better informed as to risks and alternatives instead of to questions requiring the veigh-
ing of accident costs and avoidance costs, both of which must be subjectively determined
by the trier of fact.
22. See pp. 1074-75 infra.
23. The Learned Hand test asks whether an accident avoidance measure would cost
less than it would save in accident costs, and this has very little to do with custom.
See Posner, supra note 9, at 39. Custom has not generally been a defense under the fault
system, although it may be admissible as relevant to what is proper conduct under the
circumstances. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAw or ToRTs & 17.3.
24. As to rejection of custom as an absolute defense in strict products liability cases,
see, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 IlL. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125, 138 (1968);
Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 935, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 828 (1970)
(dictum), both citing Judge Hand's famous opinion in The T. J. Hooper, 60 F2d o737
(2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Transportation Co. v. Northern Barge Co.,
287 U.S. 662. Rejection of the other extreme is implicit in rejection of the notion that
a manufacturer is liable without exception for accidents arising out of the use of his
products. See, e.g., the products liability cases cited in note 5 supra.
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The courts have instead tended to determine whether a defect exists
by asking a series of secondary questions relating to (a) the adequacy
of warning and (b) the use to which the product was put. They have
also noted that assumption of risk on the part of the victim might serve
either to negate the existence of a defect or to be a defense to it."5 In
fact, the defense of assumption of risk may be viewed as broad enough
to encompass adequacy of warning and appropriateness of product use,
which are in turn appropriate ways of raising some of the questions
implicit in the strict liability test we have offered.
Let us look first to adequacy of warning. Suppose that a product
occasionally causes the user's leg to fall off. Failure to warn the poten-
tial user that this may happen in .0001 per cent of the cases will nor-
mally result in manufacturer liability. 26 But even such a warning is not
likely to allow the user to make an intelligent cost-benefit analysis be-
tween accident and avoidance costs. Unless the user has reason to be-
lieve himself to be in the dangerous category and unless a close sub-
stitute exists which at some cost avoids the danger, the user is hardly
in a position to evaluate the benefits of the product as against its costs.
The producer may seem to be no better suited, but if we move from a
static to a dynamic situation, this will not be the case. The producer is
in a position to compare the existing accident costs with the costs of
avoiding this type of accident by developing either a new product or
a test which would serve to identify the risky .0001 per cent. The con-
sumer, in practice, cannot make this comparison. Relatively, the pro-
ducer is the cheapest cost avoider, the party best suited to make the
cost-benefit analysis and to act upon it.
Should a patch test be developed which enables the consumer to
identify himself as an especially risky user, the situation may well be
changed. The existence of the patch test, sold together with the prod-
uct and coupled with a warning, may be enough to make the consumer
the party best able to avoid the costs of mishap.21 This will depend in
part, but only in part, on the nature of the warning and the adequacy
(including ease of use) of the patch test. Even if the warning is unmis-
takably clear and the patch test 100 per cent accurate, however, the
manufacturer may still be in the best position to make the cost-benefit
analysis. For the analysis depends not only on the adequacy of the warn-
ing and the likelihood that a risky user will be able to identify him-
25. See note 4 supra.
26. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Basko
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir. 1969).
27. See, e.g., Matthis v. Lehn & Fink Products Corp., 70 Wash.2d 541, 424 P.2d 281
(1967).
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self, but also on the availability of alternatives to the product.2s If the
product is a cosmetic with many reasonably close substitutes, identify-
ing and clearly warning the risky group will very likely put the user in
the best position to choose. If instead the product is a medicine, the use
of which is the only way of saving the user's life, identifying and warn-
ing the risky users probably would not suffice to make the users the
better choosers.29 The manufacturer would in those circumstances be
best suited to compare the cost of the occasional lost leg with the cost
of further research designed to give rise to an adequate substitute en-
tailing fewer risks, or equivalent risks but to another definable group.30
We do not mean to suggest that these examples resolve the issue, but
they should serve to indicate why, when courts ask about adequacy of
warning in attempting to determine whether a defect exists, they are
often on the right track. The examples also demonstrate why mere
clarity of warning or mere percentages of likelihood of harm may not
by themselves resolve the issue. For these are only factors going to the
basic question of who is in the best position to make the cost-benefit
analysis and act upon it, and must be considered together with other
factors such as availability of substitutes and the nature of the user's
use of the product in order to determine liability.
The relevance of the use to which the product is put has seemed
especially troublesome for the courts.31 The fact that a lawn mower was
not designed to protect its driver should he care to drive it on the
throughway ought not to be viewed as a design defect making the man-
28. Alternatives include not only alternative products, but also non-use of the product.
29. This is because the cheapest cost avoider must be able to make the required
analysis and act upon it, and the only meaningful action is one which would reduce
the risk. Where the product is the only medicine which will save tile ucrs life, it is
meaningless to say that the user is in a position to act upon the basis of the anal)sis.
The cost of action by the manufacturer in such a situation (i.e., research for alterna-
tive products) may have an undesirable effect in the long run. Charging tile manu-
facturer may unduly reduce the number or output of drug companies. Whether the
long run effect, if it exists, is sufficiently adverse to negate the short run effect
depends on the relative ability of the users as against the manufacturers to avoid the
accident costs in the long run, that is, on which is the cheapest cost asoider in the long
run. In this example it is hard to see what the user could do in the long run. In other
situations, however, the long run issue may turn on the relative merits of more output
in different industries.
Undesirable long run effects may, of course, be dealt with through governmental
subsidies funded by lump sum taxes on the long run cheapest cost avoider; this seems
to us to be a better solution by and large than denying liability. For a more detailed
treatment of the problems of long versus short run cost avoidance, see Calabresi, note
12 supra.
30. The discussion in text over-simplifies the alternatives. The manufacturer may, for
example, decide to identify the high risk users and sell the product to them at a
higher price. See CosTs, supra note 10, at 170-71. If he is allowed to do this, and if
doing it is economically feasible, the long run consequences of imposing liability on
him referred to in note 28, supra, may be avoided. See id. at 162. 163-72.
31. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corporation, 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966);
Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
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ufacturer liable either to users or to rescuers. But neither should a
warning that the lawn mower ought not to be used where there are
rocks preclude manufacturer's liability to passers-by hit by rocks or
even to the user himself. Again, the issue is who can best make a cost-
benefit analysis and act on it, viewed in realistic terms. Many uses of
a product, though forbidden by the producer, are actually not unex-
pected. Other uses, though not forbidden, are in fact so unusual as to
make the user more suited to make the cost-benefit analysis than the
manufacturer.
Moreover, the question whether the manufacturer could sufficiently
anticipate the use32 as to be in a good position to make the cost-bene-
fit analysis has little to do with whether society deems the use worth
its costs. In other words, it is logically distinct from the question of
whether the user was contributorily negligent. Thus a user may have
an excellent reason for driving down the throughway on a lawn mower
(the benefits of the use outweigh the costs), in which case the collective
decider in a negligence/contributory negligence regime ought not to
deem his conduct to be contributorily negligent. Yet such a user would
in all probability be a better evaluator than the manufacturer of the
costs and benefits involved. As a consequence, his strict liability suit
against the manufacturer for injuries resulting from such driving
would fail.33 Conversely, the fact that a use of the product is deemed
contributorily negligent does not necessarily mean that the manufac-
turer is not in a better position than the user to evaluate the costs and
benefits. To take an example from a different area of strict liability,
a worker may negligently use a piece of equipment, but his employer
may nonetheless be in a better position to evaluate the relevant costs
and benefits. That is, he may know the propensity to negligent use and
be better able to evaluate a substitute piece of equipment which can-
not readily be negligently used. This explains why contributory neg-
ligence has not been an inevitable defense to an action based on strict
liability.3 4
We hope that the foregoing discussion of adequacy of warning and
appropriateness of use has caused the reader to think that what we have
32. See, e.g., Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. App., 1970); and
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967),
holding that an abnormal use of a product relieves the defendant from liability only
if such use is not reasonably foreseeable.
33. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (D.Ind. 1965),
where the court stated that although contributory negligence is not a defense to strict
products liability, "misuse" is a defense.
34. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska, 1970); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich
Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968).
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been talking about sounds strangely like assumption of risk, not in its
secondary, and technically improper, sense of contributory negligence,
but in its original sense.3 The doctrine of assumption of risk-though
grossly misapplied by courts which have not looked realistically to
whether the plaintiff in practice had the requisite knowledge and pos-
sibility of choice the doctrine implied-is essential to an understanding
of a non-fault world. 31 It is, and always has been, a kind of plaintiff's
strict liability-the other side of the coin of defendant's strict liability.
It may even go to negate defendant's negligence, by expressing a judg-
ment that although the defendant's conduct was not worth its costs
(i.e., was negligent), the plaintiff was in a better position than tie de-
fendant to evaluate the costs and benefits involved (i.e., tie plaintiff
assumed the risk). Just as the employer may be in the better position to
evaluate the costs and benefits of a piece of equipment given the like-
lihood of occasional employee negligence (defendant's strict liability),
so a spectator at a baseball game may be best suited to evaluate the
desirability of sitting in an unscreened bleacher given the likelihood
of occasional negligent wild throws by the players during the game
which may result in the spectator's being hit on the head (plaintiff's
strict liability, or assumption of risk).37 In both these situations, tie
conclusion as to whether an accident cost should be shifted depends not
on whether a party was negligent, but rather on a judgment as to which
party was in a better position to make the cost-benefit analysis irrespec-
tive of the other's negligence.3s In each situation, strict liability
(whether defendant's or plaintiff's) is imposed regardless of whether
the other party "ought" to have done what he did.
35. In its original, or "primary" sense, assumption of risk bars recovery by a plaintiff
who voluntarily and reasonably chooses to encounter a known risk. See 2 F. H,1,nr &
F. JAMES, THE LAw oF ToRTs, § 21.1 (1956).
36. Cf. Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CAU. L. RE. 189,
206 (1965), suggesting that there is a "haunting analogy" between Chief Justice Tra)nor's
emphasis on the inability of the consumer to detect defects in the goods he bu)s (i.e.,
to avoid the risks) and the distinction drawn in terms of assumption of risk between
traffic accidents and "accidents" between adjoining landowners by Blackburn, J., in
Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Fxch. 265, 287 (1866), aff'd sub non. R)lands v. Fletcher
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
Another interesting analogy is that between Chief Justice Traynor's emphasis on dis-
tributional considerations (see, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal2d
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion)) and Bohlen's suggestion that the judges
who wrote the opinions in Fletcher v. Ryiands sought to protect the landed gentry
against the encroachments of industry. Bohlen, The Rule in Itylands v. Fletcher, 59
U. PA. L. R~v. 298 (1911). See generally part VI, in Ira.
37. Cf. Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass'n, 105 Wash. 215, 177 P. 776, 181 P. 679
(1919).
38. Thus strict liability cannot be explained as the "reverse" of negligence, or as a
reverse Learned Hand test, for if it did it would have to take into account the negligence
of the injurer, i.e., reverse contributory negligence (see pp. 1038.59 supra) in determining
whether to shift the cost from injurer to victim because of the victim's conduct.
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The doctrine of assumption of risk, properly interpreted, not only
encompasses the questions the courts are now asking about adequacy
of warning and appropriateness of use, but also can be viewed as cov-
ering much of the traditional rubric by which the classical forms of
strict liability were limited. These forms of liability, whether for ani-
mals, ultrahazardous activities, Fletcher v. Rylands situations30 or even
workmen's compensation, were limited in two general ways. The first
limit was usually put in terms of whether the injury stemmed from the
risk whose presence was the reason for making the activity strictly lia-
ble. Had a cow trespassed, or had it instead bitten a neighbor; had a
tiger mangled somebody, or had it simply chewed grass; had a bomb
exploded, or had it just rolled and crushed somebody's foot?40 The sec-
ond limit was usually put in terms of whether the victim had done
something which, though not necessarily negligent, had especially ex-
posed him to the risk. Had the victim engaged in an "unnatural" use
of his land; had the victim, a zoologist, gone into the tiger's cage to
study the family habits of large cats; had the victim gone where no
blasting company could expect humans to be?41 In setting out these
limits, the courts were in effect expressing judgments as to whether the
injurer or the victim could better decide the advantages of avoidance
as against accident costs. Both limits suggest questions such as who has
the greater knowledge of the risk involved and who is better able to
choose to avoid that risk by altering behavior should the risk appear
too great. In discussing both these limits, moreover, the courts seemed
to consider irrelevant the question of whether a third-party decider
would approve of the decision made or not, and concentrated instead
on who could best make the decision. The issue was not, in other
words, whether the owner of the land ought to build a reservoir or
keep tigers as he did. Neither was it whether the victim acted "reason-
ably" in engaging in an unnatural use of his land or in entering the
tiger's cage. Instead it was whether his situation made him better suited
than the owner to compare the benefits and the costs of the risk he
took.4
2
To say this, though, is to remain at much too simple a level. We have
so far assumed simply an injurer and a victim, when in fact each be-
39. Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H & C 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd Fletcher v.
Rylands. L.R. I Exch. 265 (1866), afj'd Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
40. See, e.g., Hartford v. Brady, 114 Mass. 466 (1874); Wiggins v. Industrial Accident
Bd., 170 P. 9 (Mont., 1918); Scribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14 (N.Y. 1862); Troth v. Wills,
8 Pa. Super. 1 (1897) (Wickham, J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Rozewski v. Simpson, 9 Cal.2d 515, 71 P.2d 72 (1937); Oklahoma City v.
Hudson, 405 P.2d 178 (Okla. 1965); Harder v. Maloney, 250 Wis. 233, 26 N.W.2d 830
(1947).
42. See, e.g., Rozewski v. Simpson, 9 Cal. 2d 515, 71 P.2d 72 (1937).
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longs to a category of blasters, factory owners, product users, workers,
and so forth.43 We have assumed that the costs of paying for accidents
or avoiding them rest on the individual, and therefore that the cost-
benefit decision under a strict liability rule is made at a totally decen-
tralized level. Furthermore, we have ignored the problems which arise
when the victim is neither the blaster nor the blastee, but a third party
rescuer, neither the lawn mower manufacturer nor the user who rides
it on the highway, but a pedestrian who is hit when it goes out of con-
trol. Such problems obviously cannot be ignored under either a fault
or a strict liability standard. 44 Similarly, we have avoided the problem
of who is to decide which category is in the best position to make the
cost-benefit analysis and act on it, and how generalized this decision is
to be. That is, we have ignored (a) who decides whether blasters are
generally better suited than blastees to balance costs and benefits, (b)
how many exceptions to this general notion will be permitted, and (c)
who will be permitted to find that a given situation is an exception.
These problems do not alter the test; they require, however, somewhat
more sophistication in its application.
IV. The Strict Liability Test Refined
A. Level and Generality of Application
The greatest differences among areas of strict liability go precisely
to the question of the level of generality at which a decision is made
with respect to the category or party best suited to make the appropri-
ate cost-benefit analysis. In blasting and ultrahazardous activities gen-
erally, the court-made decision that the blaster is best suited to make
the cost-benefit analysis is at a high level of generality. In many jur-
isdictions the decision contemplates virtually no exceptions so long as
the injury arises out of the risk which makes the activity ultrahazard-
ous.45 The likelihood of foolish behavior by the victim or the unusual
sensitivity of some victims are deemed to be best considered by the
blaster. Some courts, it is true, have raised the question of whether
there would be liability if a blaster blasted in what seemed to be a
totally deserted place.46 The victim, these courts have in effect said,
is better suited to gauge the costs of making his presence in such an
43. See generally CosTs, supra note 10, passinm.
44. See Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969). and cases
there cited.
45. See, e.g., Bedell v. Goulter, 199 Ore. 344. 261 P.2d 842 (1953).
46. See, e.g., Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co., 152 Cal. 500, 93 P. 82 (1901);
Kendall v. Johnson, 51 Wash. 477, 99 P. 310 (1909).
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unusual place known as against the costs of taking whatever risks may
be attendant on being in a place unexpectedly. But some judges have in
effect reasoned that such an exception, precisely because it would re-
quire more individualized judgments, might not be worth making47
Perhaps an occasional victim would be better suited to make the cost-
benefit analysis, but the administrative cost of dealing with such in-
stances would not be worthwhile, given their presumed rarity.
In strict products liability, instead, the judgment, again court-made,
that by and large producers are better suited than users to make the
cost-benefit analysis is deemed much less generally applicable, and the
manufacturer is allowed to try to show in each specific case that the
usef was in the best position to make the analysis. The questions asked
as to the adequacy of warning and the appropriateness of use, and, in
some jurisdictions, the availability of the defense of contributory negli-
gence, suggest how far from certain courts are that the generalized
premise that the producer is the cheapest cost avoider will apply to the
individual case.48 As a result, a combination of judge and jury is allowed
to find that given the availability of substitutes, the adequacy of warn-
ing and the capacity of an individual user to identify himself as being
especially risky or especially safe, the general assumption as to who is
better suited to compare the risks and benefits will not apply. That
such determinations must be made in ways which are much more real-
istic than were analogous decisions in old assumption of risk cases, is
the lesson of cases like Henningsen and Sills.4 9 But this in no way de-
tracts from the judgment that in determining who is better suited to
make a cost-benefit analysis in products liability cases, a fair degree of
case by case analysis is worthwhile.
Workmen's compensation differs from both ultrahazardous activities
and products liability in that the original decision was legislatively
made. It also differs in that it tends to divide the decision of who is
better suited to evaluate costs and benefits according to the type of
damage rather than type of accident. We are not here concerned with
47. The administrative costs of making such individualized judgments would pre-
sumably be too great. See, e.g., Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering
Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951) (Baldwin, J., concurring), noting that such lihi.
tations on strict liability for blasting "add a needless and confusing qualification or
condition." 137 Conn. at 576, 79 A.2d at 598.
48. New Jersey is one jurisdiction where contributory negligence remains a defense
to strict liability. Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965). C,
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (195.
This may be in part the result of the abandonment of the defense of assumption of risk In
New Jersey. See note 55 infra. See generally Supp. to 2 F. HARPER & F. JANMES, Tita LAW
OF TORTS § 22.7 (1968).
49. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 858, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), Sills v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., supra note 44.
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the fact that workmen's compensation schedules are hopelessly out of
date,50 but instead with the very fact that they deal with damages on a
scheduled basis. The result of this is that the measure of damages for
dignitary losses and even wage losses is that of the ordinary worker
doing that job. If a great violinist mangles his hand in a steel mill, caus-
ing him extreme suffering and economic loss, that is his burden. One
may contrast this with cases involving ultrahazardous activities where,
except in very unusual situations, one takes one's victim as one finds
him. On the other hand, the fact that a worker is warned that a machine
is especially dangerous, or must be used in a given way, will not negate
the employer's liability, short of extremes like wanton and wilful be-
havior by the victim.51
Without going into further detail, one can discern a certain ration-
ality in these cases as to the appropriate level of generality of the origi-
nal liability decision and the exceptions made to it. This does not mean
we agree with all of the cases, by any means. But it is not unreasonable
to suppose that a violinist is the best evaluator of the relative advan-
tages and costs of working in a steel mill, with regard to the suffering
he will feel if he loses his hand, while he is not as likely to be in that
position with respect to blasting injuries. Similarly, a user of a product
may be well suited to evaluate whether he wishes to use a given prod-
uct in a given way despite a warning of danger, whereas an employee
using that same product on the job would not be so suited. If we add
to the foregoing considerations the administrative costs inherent in
allowing an attempt to show an exception to the general rule, it is easy
to understand the levels of generality which have in fact emerged.52
B. Categories of Injurers and Victims
So far we have discussed the problems involved in minimizing pri-
mary accident costs as if either the injurer or the victim actually bore
the losses which occurred. As has been amply discussed elsewhere, that
is clearly not the case.53 The existence of insurance and of other ways
in which a cost is removed from its initial bearer and borne ultimately
by others need not be reexamined here. The effect of factors such as
insurance on the choice of the party to hold liable under a strict lia-
bility test must, however, be made explicit.
50. See U.S. DEP'r OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, BULL. NO. 161 STATE
WORruKEN's COMPENSATION LAwS (1969).
51. See IA A. LARSON, WORKmEN'S COMPFNS .TIo. Low § 31 (1967).
52. The administrative costs include, of course, the likelihood of error which may
result from a particularized approach, as well as the costs of adjudicating particular
disputes. See Cosrs, supra note 10, at 251, 255-59.
53. See the discussion of externalization in Cosrs, supra note 10, at 144-50, 244-50.
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It does no good to leave the accident cost on the victim in a products
liability case, on the ground that he is in a better position than the
injurer to make a cost-benefit analysis, if the victim will not bear the
loss in any event. The issue must be whether, given the fact of this
"externalization," the actual bearer of the loss is better suited to make
the analysis than is the injurer (assuming, of course, that the injurer
would bear the loss if he were held liable). The point is a simple one
and need not be gone into at length. The crucial decision on who is
best suited to make the appropriate cost-benefit analysis must be made
among the categories which actually bear a loss and not among the
individuals who only do so initially.
54
This point is, of course, equally valid for the two Learned Hand type
tests. Sophisticated application of those tests would require that the
collective judgment as to whether costs are worth avoiding be made at
the level of categories which would end up paying, and not at the level
of the single injurer and single victim. The fact that in practice this is
almost impossible under existing fault rules is one of the weaknesses of
the fault-insurance system as a device for reducing primary accident
costs.55 In theory, however, it should be admitted that one could apply
a Learned Hand test at a category level. Whether the language of fault
with the stigma it implies would also be appropriate to such a test at
a non-individual level may be quite another matter.
C. The Need for Realism in Applying the Test
It should come as no surprise that considerations of knowledge, alter-
natives, and category levels are implicit in the search for the cheapest
cost avoider. The very fact that these factors are only implicit in the
test, however, requires us to be extremely practical in gauging their
existence in specific situations.50
54. This does not mean that there should be one liability rule for insured persons
and another for the uninsured. It means instead that in devising a rule appropriate to
a particular category, the availability of insurance and other means of externalzing
costs should be taken into account. The resulting liability rule would thus reflect the
general extent of externalization from the individual to the entire category, though
the rule might well be applied to all those within the category, whether insured or
not. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 111. 2d 326, 336-38,
211 N.E.2d 253, 259-60 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946, abrogating the doctrine of
charitable immunity in Illinois; cf. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S,2d
529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969).
55. See Cosrs, supra note 10, at 244-50. The current movement for reform in the
treatment of automobile accidents can be explained in part by the tendency of the
traditional system to incur considerable administrative costs as a result of focusing oil
specific accidents in allocating costs among the parties despite the fact that the costs
allocated are externalized through liability insurance.
56. A recent opinion refusing to dismiss the complaint in an action seeking recovery
from the entire blasting cap industry for injuries to children caused by blasting caps
is a good example of the kind of approach which is required. Chance v. E.I. Dul'ont
de Nemours & Co., 69 C-273 (E.D.N.Y., decided May 18, 1972).
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In this regard, it is well to reemphasize the relational nature of the
test. It does not matter that there is currently no way in which a manu-
facturer of a risky medicine can make it safer for users who have no
realistic alternative to taking the medicine-even though the user can
identify himself as an especially risky party. Relalively, the manufac-
turer is better suited to make the only cost-benefit analysis that matters,
which is one between further research and current damages. The prob-
lem may be very different if the medicine has reasonably close substi-
tutes which carry different risks for different groups of people. An ex-
ample might be a birth control pill which carries some risks of throm-
bosis to a group which can readily identify itself (say, through a blood
test), but which has substitutes-either another pill which avoids that
risk but is slightly less than 100 per cent effective (and, therefore, car-
ries a risk for another easily self-defining group, those who wish a baby
under no circumstances and object to abortions even if legal), or other
fully effective but cumbersome birth control devices. The existence of
close substitutes in this case may make the user best able to conduct
the appropriate cost-benefit analysis.
Similarly, the need to establish the relative ability to make a cost-
benefit analysis requires us to look realistically at the ability of the par-
ties to act upon a perception that they are in risky categories. If there
are only two medicines available to combat a serious disease, one in-
volving a .0001 per cent risk of losing a leg, and the other involving a
.0001 per cent risk of losing an arm, it is not realistic to suggest that the
user is well suited to act upon the findings of a cost-benefit analysis.
True, violinists will tend to prefer one medicine and olympic runners
the other, but for most people no meaningful choice is available, and
the size of the risk involved is so small, that it seems likely that leaving
the loss on the user will result in little incentive to research.5'' It seems
to us preferable to make the producer liable and thereby create a situa-
tion where there is a meaningful incentive to research, even though this
may somewhat increase pharmaceutical costs to people who value only
their feet.58
Realism is especially necessary when third parties are involved. Then
the question is not whether, for example, the category to which the
seller belongs or the one to which the user belongs is in the best posi-
57. We are not suggesting that the basic purpose of strict liability necessarily is, or
should be, the creation of additional incentives toward safety research. In the example
in text, our proposed test imposes liability on the manufacturer because he is the party
who can, by actions reasonably to be expected, reduce the risk. See note 29 u pra.
58. It may be that the producer is not the cheapest cost avoider in the long run.
and this needs to be kept in mind in deciding whether to impose liability. See note 29
supra. Compare Posner at 75-76, RsTATE..MsEr oF ToRTs, SECOND, § 402A, Comment K,
and McLeod v. W.. Mferrell Co., 174 So.2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1965).
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tion to make the cost-benefit analysis; rather, it must be asked which
category is in that position relative to the category to which the third-
party victim belongs. Sometimes the third party's category is the cheap-
est cost avoider and then the problem is easy. At other times, however,
things are not so simple. If both the manufacturer and the user are in a
better position than the third party victim to make the cost-benefit
analysis, the strict liability test would require, as a general rule, that the
victim should recover, whether he sues the manufacturer or the user.t1
If the victim chose to sue the party other than the cheapest cost avoider,
that defendant should be free to join the cheapest cost avoider as a de-
fendant or to sue him subsequently for indemnity. In either case, the
strict liability rule would make the cheapest cost avoider liable and
optimization of primary accident costs would be achieved, at least if we
ignore the administrative costs of joinder or of the indemnification
suit. There may well be situations, however, in which the relative abili-
ties of the manufacturer and the user to make the cost-benefit analysis
are so clear, and the administrative costs of joinder or indemnification
are so great, that we would deny liability if the victim made the
"wrong" choice and sued a defendant other than the cheapest cost
avoider. For in these cases the victim is in the best position to choose
the optimal defendant and should be induced to do so. But courts may
in some cases be misled into assuming that where the user is in a better
position than the manufacturer to make the cost-benefit analysis, it
follows that the manufacturer should not be liable to third parties.00
This error may be compounded by a tendency to assume that in third
party situations the user is in a better position merely because the
manufacturer warned him.G' Instead, the fact that a manufacturer
has warned the user to avoid a particular use should serve to bar a
third party victim from recovering from the manufacturer only if (a)
the warning is so clearly adequate as to settle the issue between man-
ufacturer and user and (b) this fact is sufficiently known to the victim
after the accident as to put him in a good position to choose the proper
59. The trend is toward strict liability of the manufacturer for injuries to third.party
bystanders. See Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969) and cases
there cited.
60. Compare Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Ind. 1969). Al
analogous assumption often made is that a drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to con-
sumers ("third parties") by warning the medical profession ("the users") of possible side
effects. See, eg., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969).
61. Thus in the drug cases it may be assumed that if a manufacturer warns the doctor
of a slight risk associated with a valuable drug, the doctor is thereby placed in a better
position than the manufacturer to make the cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968). This will not necessarily
be the case. See pp. 1062-63 supra.
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defendant.0 2 The point is not so much that the concepts are hard, but
rather that they can quite easily be applied erroneously.
In this respect, the history of the doctrine of assumption of risk is
instructive. The doctrine asked questions like whether the defendant
had the "right" to impose the risk on the plaintiff, which frequently
made it circular. 3 An emphasis instead on knowledge and appreciation
of the risk and availability of alternatives, equally part of the doctrine,
might easily have enabled it to serve to absolve defendants only in those
situations where the plaintiff's category was the cheapest cost avoider-
where, in other words, the cost-benefit analysis was better left to the
plaintiff.0 4 Instead, the doctrine came to be applied in cases where
knowledge and appreciation of the risk and availability of alternatives
were in no realistic sense present for the plaintiff.0 5 This may well have
been because goals other than primary cost reduction prevailed in those
cases, and the circular elements in the language of assumption of risk
were emphasized while non-existent knowledge and appreciation of
risk were assumed in order to suit those goals.00 Thus applied, the doc-
trine has been much attacked.67 That it survived at all suggests that the
62. Cf. Eck v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197 (7tih Cir. 19S).
63. See F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, TiE I.W oF ToRTs § 21.3 (1956).
64. There have been, of course, many assumption of risk cases where appreciation
of the risk and the availability of alternatives have been emphasized. See, e.g., Guerrero
v. Westgate Lumber Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 612, 331 P.2d 107 (1958); Ridgwa) v. Yenn),
223 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d 581 (1944); Rush v. Commercial Realty Co.. 7 N.J. Misc. 337,
145 A. 476 (1929).
65. This was particularly true in industrial accident cases antedating the passage of
workmen's compensation legislation. See, e.g., Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll. 84 Fed.
772, 28 C.C.A. 207, 52 U.S. App. 442 (1898); Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R.R. Co., 136 Pa.
618, 20 A. 517 (1890). But see Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N.Y. 234, 30 N.E. 573 (1892).
66. This suggestion is a familiar one. See, e.g., Tiller v. ,tlautic Coast Line R.R.,
318 U.S. 54, 58-67 (1943).
Compare Posner's suggestion, Posner, supra note 9, at .15-46, that assumption of risk
was "supported by economic logic," since it served to enable the risk preferring em-
ployee (a railroad brakeman employed on a train not equipped with standard safely
appliances in Posner's example) to "market his taste for risk." Of course, the same ob-
jective could have been achieved without the assumption of risk doctrine by allowing
the employer to "buy out" from liability. In theory, precisely the same wage differentials
and safety precautions would result as are set forth in l'osner's example. See alabresi,
Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216, 225-28
(1965). In practice, however, the assumption of risk doctrine, by placing the risk on the
employee in the first instance, may not have served adequately to inforn the cmplo)ce
of the risk he was assuming, whereas a rule placing liability on the emplo'er unless he
could "buy out" (i.e., persuade the employee to accept the risk) would presumably llase
served to inform the employee of the nature and magnitude of the risk, This assumes,
of course, that during the period covered by Posner's study railroads were better in-
formed about the hazards of operating without standard safety appliances than were
brakemen.
67. See, e.g., Bohlen, l oluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARn. L. REV. 14, 91 (1906);
James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952); James, Assumption of Risk: Un-
happy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
The doctrine has been abandoned in some jurisdictions, in part because of tile con-
fusion which has prevailed in its application. See, e.g., McGrath v. American Cyanamid
Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963).
1073
The Yale Law Journal
kernel of truth it contains is quite real, not that its application was
often correct. Concepts like "the cheapest cost avoider" or "the category
best suited to make the cost-benefit analysis" can be as easily misap-
plied as assumption of risk. This does not, however, mean they are use-
less. It only means that courts and legal scholars should be assiduous in
scrutinizing their use, in criticizing misapplications and in pointing out
when they are being employed to serve goals other than those of pri-
mary accident cost reduction. 68
V. The Learned Hand Test Versus the Strict Liability Test
If the strict liability test is often difficult to apply correctly, and if
Learned Hand type tests might, in theory, be just as capable of accom-
plishing optimal primary accident cost reduction, why have such fault-
based tests fallen increasingly into disfavor?69 It is not likely that the
answer lies simply in the existence of distributional goals which are
better served by the strict liability test. That such goals are relevant we
have no doubt, and we shall discuss their relevance later. But their
relevance must be limited, since the two Learned Hand tests themselves
accomplish diametrically different distributional results7 0 Thus if the
aim of the current trend away from the fault system were simply to
favor victims as a category, this could be done as well-indeed better-
by shifting from the Learned Hand test to the reverse Learned Hand
test than by shifting to a strict liability standard. The suspicion must
remain that the shift to strict liability is based in part on other grounds.
It has already been noted that the Learned Hand type tests are more
"interventionistic," more collective, than is the strict liability test. Un-
der either of the Hand tests, an organ of the state decides whether an
action is worthwhile or not, and imposes the costs on the actor if it
deems the action not worthwhile. It is not hard to see that this involves
a greater degree of state involvement than that implied in the strict lia-
bility test. The latter implies state intervention only to decide which
category can best determine whether an action is worthwhile, and this
in turn implies less risk that traditional kinds of collective considera-
tions will come into play.71 But this difference between the tests,
though politically significant, hardly accounts for the decline in popu-
larity of the fault tests. After all, we have also seen an increase in recent
68. We do not mean to suggest that other goals are irrelevant to accident law, but
that courts, legislatures and scholars should try to avoid confusing primary accident
cost reduction with other goals. See part VI, infra, for a discussion of other goals.
69. See notes 1, 2 & 3 supra.
70. See p. 1059 supra.
71. See note 20 supra.
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years in direct criminal prohibitions aimed at conduct in tie accident
area deemed not worthwhile.72 Such prohibitions surely involve greater
state intervention than do even the Learned Hand tests. 3 That politi-
cal preference for laissez faire has spurred the move toward strict lia-
bility therefore seems as unlikely as the explanation that the move has
been solely influenced by distributional goals. We suspect that the
move to strict liability today, no less than similar moves to respondent
superior, ultrahazardous activity liability and workmen's compensation
in the past, are based at least in part on a desire to accomplish better
primary accident cost reduction.
Earlier we noted that it seems unlikely that either Learned Hand
test could effectively be applied in practice at the category level. We
questioned whether at the level where it really mattered, that is at the
level of who actually pays, the rubric of "fault" is likely to be con-
genial. And yet it is clear that if the Learned Hand tests are to accom-
plish optimal primary accident cost reduction they must be applied at
that level, and not at the arbitrary level of parties to an accident who
do not ultimately bear the costs and who are not therefore given any
incentive to choose avoidance even where it is worthwhile. The appro-
priate avoidance decisions must be made at a category level, and at
that level the Learned Hand tests may seem unjust. Furthermore, the
categories which end up bearing the losses as a result of an application
of negligence tests on a case by case basis are not likely to be those
which would be selected were such tests applied at a category level, nor
is this technique likely to be the most efficient way available for select-
ing the categories which are chosen. All this has been discussed at
length elsewhere, and need not be gone into further,74 but it is impor-
tant to note that the reluctance to apply the Learned Hand test to
categories may be a significant underlying explanation for the current
disfavor of "negligence" calculus type tests.
There is, however, another set of reasons which may explain the
move away from Learned Hand tests. Hard though the strict liability
72. The prohibitions which have received the most attention have been those re-
lating to automobile safety. See the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1381-1431 (Supp. 1972).
73. For example, under either Hand type test, a party burdened with the costs be-
cause the collective deciders have deemed avoidance to be worthwhile may, at least in
some cases, choose to omit safety measures and pay compensatory damages instead. In
contrast, a collective prohibition is generally meant to be obeyed. See Cosrs, supra note
10, at 68-69.
74. See Cosrs, supra note 10, at 255-59. To summarize that discussion briefly: case-
by-case determination entails substantial administrative costs, tends to focus on unusual
rather than recurring causes and on accident avoidance rather than accident cost
avoidance, and is a misleading way of compiling those statistics which are meaningful
at the category level.
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test may be to apply correctly, it is nonetheless easier to apply than is
the calculus of fault. We have seen that it may well be difficult to know
whether the category to which a seller, user or third party belongs can
best make a cost-benefit analysis of risks involved and act on that analy-
sis. But it is more difficult still to decide correctly not only who can
most cheaply act on a cost-benefit analysis, but also what the result of
that cost-benefit analysis must be. Yet this is precisely what the Learned
Hand-type tests require of the governmental deciders if they are to
achieve optimal primary accident cost avoidance. None of the signifi-
cant difficulties involved in the strict liability test are avoided, and to
them is added the danger that the governmental deciders will resolve
the cost-benefit analysis incorrectly.
One cannot answer, -moreover, that the Learned Hand-type tests
avoid some of the difficulties inherent in the strict liability test by de-
ciding collectively whether or not avoidance is worthwhile, whereas the
strict liability test leaves such judgments to the individual categories.
This answer is not available because the negligence tests result in com-
pensatory damages rather than prohibitions. Individual categories are,
therefore, allowed to decide that avoidance is not worthwhile despite a
contrary determination by the collectivity (or vice versa).7r
This may serve to explain the concomitant, seemingly paradoxical
rise of collective prohibitions together with the less interventionistic
strict liability test, at the expense of negligence type tests. Where a col-
lective determination that an action is not worthwhile can be made with
a modicum of assurance, prohibitions enforced criminally or through
uninsurable fines seem appropriate. Where, instead, there is serious
doubt that such a collective determination of utility is likely to be cor-
rect, the best solution is an individualistic one. This implies a decision
limited to selecting the best decider, the cheapest cost avoider, among
the relevant categories, and not extending to which particular acts or
forebearances are appropriate. Viewed in this light, the rise of crimi-
nally enforced prohibitions in some areas, and strict liability in others,
rather than being paradoxical, can be viewed as a quite sensible reac-
tion to the same stimulus-that is, to the desire to minimize the sum of
accident costs and the costs of avoiding accidents.
VI. Relationship to Other Goals
We have seen that there are a variety of devices which could in
theory be used to accomplish primary accident cost reduction. Concep-
75. See note 73 supra. Of course, a party may also decide to ignore a collective pro-
hibition, but in considering the likelihood and magnitude of the penalty he must take
into account the stigma involved, and this results in a very different kind of calculus,
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tually, they range from: (a) those in which the decision-maker is highly
centralized and makes criminally enforceable determinations of which
actions are worthwhile and which are not through (b) those in which
negligence type calculi are employed to make the same decisions at a
more decentralized but nonetheless state agency level, enforcing those
decisions through compensatory damages; to (c) those in which collec-
tive decisions are made only to identify who is the cheapest cost avoider
-the category best suited to determine if avoidance of accidents is
worth its costs-allowing the chosen category to make the cost-benefit
decision itself. We have also seen that these devices in practice imply
different likelihoods of success in accomplishng primary cost avoidance.
Finally, we have seen that these approaches will each have a different
distributional effect. Far from being insignificant, distributional dif-
ferences may well determine the approach chosen. Some discussion of
distributional effects and goals is thus essential to an understanding of
the two Learned Hand type tests and the strict liability alternative.
In discussing the distributional aspects of liability rules there are two
problems which it is well to separate. The first relates to the types of
effects that are lumped together in the concept of distribution, and the
proper role of each of these effects in the choice of liability rules. The
second goes to the quite different question of the appropriate role of
juries and courts, as against legislatures, in selecting among liability
rules in order to accomplish distributional effects.
That both problems are crucial can be seen through an example.
The present Learned Hand test tends to make injurers richer at the
expense of victims. The reverse Learned Hand test would have pre-
cisely the opposite effect. In choosing between them a society will pre-
sumably be influenced not only by which of the two tests is more likely
to accomplish optimal primary accident cost reduction, but also, if it
has such a preference, by which category it wishes to make wealthier.
This choice may be affected by factors such as the initial relative wealth
of the categories, but relative wealth is only a part of tie choice implied.
For one category may be better able to spread losses than the other, or
one category may in some sense be viewed as being worthier. Sorting
out the relevant effects lumped under the term distribution, therefore,
is a necessary task for society in choosing among liability rules. But
when that is done another series of questions remains: Which, if any,
of the distributional considerations are appropriate to judicial decisions
among liability rules, which are appropriate to ad hoc jury determina-
tions, and which can only be properly settled by legislatures?
It should be plain that a full treatment of these questions cannot be
1077
The Yale Law Journal
attempted in this article. Nevertheless, some indications of relevant dis-
tributional considerations and some reflections on the historical role of
courts and juries with respect to these can be offered.
For the purposes of this article, we are lumping together as distribu-
tional all those effects of liability rules which do not relate to minimiz-
ing (a) the sum of accident costs and avoidance costs, and (b) the ad-
ministrative costs entailed by that minimization. Thus under a society's
distributional goals we are including preferences of quite varied types.
These preferences may reflect a desire to distribute or fractionize losses,
often called spreading. They may reflect a preference for moving toward
a given distribution of wealth, such as greater wealth equality, better
treatment for higher castes, or better treatment for castes which in the
past have been poorly treated. They may instead reflect a desire to fur-
ther what might be viewed as dynamic efficiency goals-as might occur
by favoring the doers, the entrepreneurs in a society. Finally, they may
reflect a society's notion, if it has one or if it has many, of rewarding
individuals' merits-of recognizing their just deserts.
All of these preferences are in fact relevant in some way to the choice
of liability rules. Indeed, all of them, together with the pure efficiency
notion reflected in the aim of minimizing the sum of accident and acci-
dent avoidance costs, are part of what is at times called justice.TO They
are relevant because there is no a priori reason why a legislature might
not choose a liability rule solely because it tends to redistribute income
from, say, rich to poor. Whether a legislature would be wise to employ
liability rules for this purpose is, of course, another matter. That de-
pends on, among other things, the availability of alternative devices for
accomplishing the desired income redistribution and on the effect
which this use of a liability rule might have on the achievement of
other goals whose effectuation is tied to the operation of such rules.
But there is no logical reason why a legislature's desires with respect to
income equality or caste preference cannot be well served through the
choice of one liability rule as against another. Similarly, and in prac-
tice even more commonly, a legislature's preference as to spreading,
desert and long run efficiency can effectively be furthered by choosing
one liability rule rather than another.
Recently Professor Fletcher has argued instead that the only distri-
butional considerations which should be considered in choosing among
76. See F. HARPER, THE LAW oF TORTS §§ 1, 3 & 4 (1933). See also Bierman v. City
of New York, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696, 60 Misc. 2d 497 (Civ. Ct. of the City of New York, 1969).
Cf. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 238-41, 241 A.2d 637, 646.47 (Botter, J.S.C.,
dissenting).
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liability rules are those which relate to an individual's just desert-
those which decide who is to be richer or poorer on the basis of what
people have done rather than what they are or where they start out.--
Indeed the argument goes further, and suggests that such considera-
tions should determine the choice of liability rules regardless of any
"instrumentalist" goals like the reduction of the sum of accident costs
and the costs of avoiding accidents.
In one sense, it is very easy to agree with Professor Fletcher. If a
society has a sufficiently well-developed theory of deserts such that all
the other considerations of efficiency and distributional equity we have
mentioned are reflected in that theory, then "desert" tautologically will
determine the appropriate liability rules for that society. Unfortunately,
we do not find ourselves able to define, let alone find, such an all en-
compassing theory of deserts in our society.78 Indeed, we often find
that what pass for statements of desert, of who ought to be richer or
poorer-on the basis of merit, can quite readily be seen as judgments
based on the desire to accomplish either efficient accident avoidance
or some other of the distributional preferences mentioned previously.
Nor does Professor Fletcher's test for deserts help us very much. He
argues that losses ought to lie where they fall unless the victim did not
create a risk "reciprocal" to the one which resulted in his being in-
jured. Examining examples of reciprocity and non-reciprocity, we are
struck by three things. The first is that frequently reciprocity is simply
an approximation of the result which would be required by that most
instrumentalist of tests, the strict liability test described in this article. 0
The second observation is that when reciprocity and the test we propose
seem to deviate, the strict liability result appears to be more desirable.80
77. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAsv. L. REv. 537, 547 nAO
(1972).
78. A recent book by Professor Rawls may be thought to be an attenpt to formulate
such a theory. J. RAWLs, A THEORY oF Jus'ncE (1972). But see Hampshire, A New
Philosophy of the Just Society, THE N.Y. REV. BooKs, Feb. 24, 1972, at 34 (Vol. XVIII,
No. 3) questioning whether the formulation of a complete theory of deserts is possible.
See also Feinberg, Review, 81 YALE L.J. 1004 (1972).
79. The examples of liability set out by Fletcher, supra note 77, at 54748, illustrate
this point rather well. Liability for crop dusting as between neighbors is, we think,
unrelated to whatever risks happen to be imposed upon the duster by those neighbors
who breathe his dust. It is based instead on the relative ability of the duster to calculate
the costs and benefits of dusting in the particular situation involved and act upon that
calculation.
80. Returning to Fletcher's crop dusting example, suppose instead that the parties
are a farmer who dusts his 500 acres of irrigated reclaimed desert and a homesteader
who, with knowledge of the farmer's agricultural methods, chooses out of 500.000 acres
of available (and equally beautiful, accessible and desirable, but undusted) desert one
acre adjacent to the farmer's land for a homestead. Suppose also, to give reciprocity
more than its due, that the homesteader in no way benefits from the farmer's presence,
that is, he uses none of the farmer's produce. The homesteader imposes no risks on
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The third observation is that when we do not approve (in terms of who
is made richer and who is poorer) of a result dictated by the efficiency
test, it is often in cases where reciprocity would lead to the same unde-
sirable result.8 '
None of these observations should be especially surprising. justice
notions do attach to efficiency considerations such as those served by
the strict liability test, and this is sufficient to explain why approxima-
tions of that test should seem just. They also attach to distributional
preferences like "favor spreading," "further wealth equality," and "ben-
efit a particular ethnic group," which go to what people are rather than
what they do. This explains why that which is preferable, given a soci-
ety's desire to further wealth equalization or a caste preference, may
seem more desirable than the result which either a strict liability test
or a reciprocity test would impose. Justice notions attach to other socie-
tal preferences which can only with difficulty be explained in terms of
either efficiency or wealth distributional preferences designed to make
some groups richer because of what they are. These other justice no-
tions, which we are unable to describe in general terms, are, of course,
crucial to the choice of liability rules.82 Indeed, we have elsewhere left
room for a veto of liability rules which violate such non-generalized
justice imperatives, 3 because to date these imperatives have not been
put together in a way which would enable us to talk about them other
than as constraints within which other, more generalized goals can be
seen to operate. Professor Fletcher instead offers reciprocity as a way of
putting these imperatives together in the field of accidents.
It is with this in mind then, that one must examine reciprocity. Is
there anything about reciprocity which should make it justify making
someone richer or poorer apart from efficiency and apart from distri-
butional preferences based on what people are? When the question is
the farmer, and reciprocity would therefore seem to require holding the farmer liable
for the results of dust breathing by the homesteader, regardless of the availability and
cost to the farmer of alternative methods of crop protection. The strict liability test,
taking into account the relative abilities of the parties to compare the costs of dust
breathing by the homesteader with the costs of avoidance, and to act on the basis of
such a calculation, would not impose liability on the farmer. Professor Fletcher might
respond that the homesteader "creates" the risk by moving, but that response would
reduce the reciprocity test to a tautology. That is, reciprocity would give no guidance
for decision, but would simply be a label attached to a result reached on other grounds.
81. If the farmers were a preferred group, such as disabled veterans, whose crop
dusting was essential to their livelihood, we might disapprove of a liability rule (whether
based on reciprocity or efficiency) which, in effect, prevented crop dusting.
82. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1089, 1104-05 (1972).
83. CoSTs, supra note 10, at 24-26, 291-308.
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thus posed, when reciprocity is viewed not as an approximation of effi-
ciency but as an approximation of a generalized theory of desert, it
turns out to be philosophically very meager.
8 4
If income equality, dynamic efficiency, and spreading are all rele-
vant to a society's choice of liability rules, it does not follow that all are
equally suited to being considered by courts or juries. Obviously, those
which are deemed suited to judicial considerations will depend on one's
view of the nature of adjudication and the role of courts and juries in a
legal process. We cannot possibly begin to resolve these issues in this
article. We can, however, point out some solutions which are trans-
parently too simple, both in themselves and in terms of what courts
and juries have done historically.
One cannot write off distributional considerations based on ability
to spread, or on wealth or caste, as Professor Fletcher has done, with a
reference to Aristotle and a comment that taxation is for legislatures
and not for courts.s5 When courts chose a Learned Hand test rather
than a reverse Learned Hand test, they did not simply toss a coin, given
that the tests were equally efficient in theory." Distributive conse-
quences may not have been the dominant or even a conscious motive
for the decisions, but it is difficult to argue that historically these con-
sequences were irrelevant to the choice.87 Similarly, too many courts
have explicitly considered the ability to spread losses in torts cases as a
factor in choosing one liability rule instead of another to allow us to
dismiss its relevance to judicial decisions out of hand.88 One can, of
84. The examples discussed by Fletcher, supra note 77, at 517-48 seem to indicate
that the reciprocity test is temporally bound. That is, the risk imposer who does not
recover is usually the party who creates an "unusual" risk. An unusual risk may mean
a risk which can be cheaply avoided, but that is the strict liability test. Fletcher seens
to be looking instead to which risks are new. If this is what is meant. reciprocity,
without more, is incapable of serving as a philosophical theory of desert. For it would
amount basically to saying only that those who take new risks are less deserving than
those who take customary risks.
85. See Fletcher, supra note 77, at 547, n.40.
86. Here we are assuming, with Professor Posner, that historically the courts did
"choose" a Learned Hand test. Posner, supra note 9, passim. Certainly they did not
choose the reverse.
If for some reason the tests in practice would not equally yield optimizing solutions,
if, for example, victims in practice proved far less able to alter their behavior than
injurers (notwithstanding that the value of their activity was less than the resultant
accident costs), then the choice of the Learned Hand test rather than the reverse would
imply a distributional effect in spite of efficiency considerations.
87. Cf. the explanation usually given for the development of the fellow serant rnle.
See, e.g., W. PRoss.R, ToR-rs 529 (4th ed. 1971). Cf. also note 66 supra.
88. These decisions in recent years have been an outgrowth of the concurring opinion
of Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461, 750 P.2d
436 (1944). See W. PRossER, TORTS § 5 at 22 (4th ed. 1971).
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course, question the wisdom of such decisions.8 9 One might further sug-
gest that courts should consider such distributive effects only when they
reflect reasonably explicit societal goals. Alternatively, one might main-
tain that courts should be free to follow their own distributional pref-
erences so long as they do not conflict with well defined societal goals
(such as, perhaps, efficiency), provided that the legislature has the
power to reverse the court's judgment. Finally, one might support the
position that because of the way judges are picked, they are suited to
balance other goals, like efficiency, with explicitly distributional ones
in choosing liability rules for a society. All these are possible approaches
worth considering. What one cannot do, we would suggest, is to act as
if distributional considerations did not historically play a role in judi-
cial choice of liability rules, and must not do so today regardless of the
strength and clarity of a society's commitment to specific distributional
preferences.90
Having said this, we do not here need to argue with Professor Posner
over whether the particular choice of Learned Hand test made and ap-
plied between 1895 and 1905 was based, as many have said,"1 on distri-
butional considerations or was, as he maintains, essentially an efficiency
choice.92 It is perfectly clear at the very least that that choice, both
when made well before 1895 and as applied for many years, had distri-
butional effects which are very different from those produced by alter-
native tests which were as, or more, likely to accomplish primary acci-
dent cost avoidance. That these different distributional goals seem to
be in the ascendancy today may again help to explain the move away
from the classical Learned Hand test. They do not, however, suffice to
explain why the move has been to strict liability rather than to a re-
verse Learned Hand test, which would seem to serve the currently dom-
inant distributional goals of spreading and distribution in favor of vic-
tims more fully than does the strict liability test.93
89. See, e.g., the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Taft in Lonzrick v. Republic
Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d, 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966), and of Judge Burke in Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963). See also Wights v,
Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 309, 405 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1965), where the court
refused to adopt strict products liability based on a "risk spreading" rationale, stating
that such a theory "proves too much."
90. Other institutions may do a better job of dealing with distributional considera.
tions, but this need not mean that courts are compelled to ignore them.
91. See, e.g., Horwitz, Did the Legal System Subsidize Economic Growth in Ante.
Bellum America? (unpublished paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Amercall
Historical Association, Boston, 1970).
92. Posner, supra note 9, at 82.
93. There have been numerous suggestions that a strict liability test serves the goal
of spreading; see, e.g., James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
It would require another article to go into all of the distributional ramifications of
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One more consideration remains in discussing the relationship to the
test chosen of goals other than efficiency. Not only does the choice of
test have substantial distributive effects, but its application in specific
or doubtful cases does also. Thus the issue is not simply whether a soci-
ety opts for a direct prohibition, a Learned Hand test, a reverse Learned
Hand test or a strict liability test. Whatever goals are sought will also
be at the mercy of applications of the chosen test. It is here, of course,
that Fletcher's caveat about the role of courts seems more directly in
point, though even here we would not be as ready as he is dogmatically
to exclude considerations of distributive justice from the purview of
courts and juries. The issue is a nice one and reasonable men may dif-
fer as to whether distributive considerations should apply (1) at all, or
(2) only in cases where primary cost avoidance considerations do not
provide a clear outcome, or (3) whether they ought to dominate over
efficiency considerations even when the latter would imply a clear re-
sult.
As a practical matter, we would suggest that in applications of the
traditional Learned Hand test, distributive considerations have very
frequently at least played the second role and not infrequently the
third. Unlike Posner, we find some support for this point of view in
his admirable collection of appellate decisions.0 4 Many dubious and
some clearly "inefficient" decisions can be thus explained. 05 Without
doing a similar study in more recent times, we would suggest that the
change in the application of the fault standard since 1905 which has
seemed so obvious to so many writers, may well reflect a similar kind
of interplay between new distributional goals and the efficiency impli-
cations of the traditional Learned Hand test.
This kind of interplay is unlikely to stop merely because a change
is made to a strict liability test which combines better primary acci-
dent cost avoidance with distributional goals which seem more con-
genial to the current age. Even within a regime of strict liability, courts
and juries deciding which category is the cheapest cost avoider will in
unclear cases most likely continue to consider whether some distribu-
tional goals are not best served by one decision rather than the other.
the strict liability test. We believe that this test would tend to favor victims as a category,
because in practice they are, inter alia, generally less well informed than injurers, but
it would not do so to the same extent as a reverse Learned Hand test, which would
put the cost of all accidents not worth avoiding on injurers.
94. Posner, supra note 9, at 52-96.
95. We find it difficult to agree, for example, that application of the principlc of
respondent superior to employers but not to families was based entirely on efficiency
grounds. Posner, supra note 9, at 43. It seems more likely that distributional consid-
erations were relevant to that determination.
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Nor would we be surprised if distributional goals will fairly fre-
quently lead to liability results under a strict liability test which are
pretty clearly wrong if one considers primary cost avoidance alone.
Sometimes this will be the effect of legislative determinations, but at
other times it will be the result of decisions by judge and jury-as it
has been in the past. To say that this is wrong would be to conclude
that once a liability test is chosen the role of the courts is to give effect
only to efficiency. It may well be that this conclusion is appropriate,
given the nature of courts and the lack of consensus for particular dis-
tributional preferences like spreading, greater wealth equality, or com-
pensation of maltreated castes. This conclusion is not, however, a neces-
sary one. Indeed, many years ago, Professor Clarence Morris argued that
courts were very well suited to make just this kind of distributional de-
cision, though only when whole classes of cases were affected. D0 Simi-
larly, the ability and suitability of the jury to do the same in individual
cases has been frequently argued.
97
As a practical matter, introducing such distributional considerations,
whether at the legislative or the judicial level, does make application of
the strict liability test easier, just as in the past it made application of
the Learned Hand test easier. For often a hard issue of whether the
victim's category or the injurer's category is best suited to make a cost-
benefit analysis between avoidance and compensation becomes easy if
one choice serves distributional goals while the other undercuts them.
In practice it will also be as hard to tell just what the roles of efficiency
and distribution were in making the choice as it is for Professor Pos-
ner and us to agree on what the roles of the two sets of goals were in
his 1895-1905 cases. Analytical frameworks, and the distinctions made
therein, serve to elucidate; they rarely tell us what judges and juries
did in individual cases.
VII. Conclusion
We have tried, in this article, to describe a framework, a test, which
might help to put into place the factors that seem to be central to de-
fining the limits of strict liability in the areas of the law where it has
come to dominate. We contrasted this test with the classical negligence
calculus and its mirror image. We noted that this strict liability test
seems more likely than either of the others to accomplish a minimiza-
tion of the sum of accident costs and of accident avoidance costs. We
96. Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952).
97. See, e.g., F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.4 at 240 (1965).
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then discussed why we believe the move toward such a test cannot be
explained solely in terms of distributional goals, though we readily
admitted that such goals might also be served by the move. Finally, we
expressed the view that even though such a test is very well suited to
accomplishing an optimal reduction of primary accident costs, we
would expect that in its application goals other than efficiency will
often predominate.
Because Fleming James, through his writing, teaching, and warm col-
leagueship, first guided and then sustained our earliest as well as our
more recent work in this field, we gratefully dedicate this piece to him.
May retirement for him, as it was for his teacher, Arthur Corbin, sim-
ply be an opportunity to push the quest further.
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